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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Despite historical tensions between the Dominican Republic 
and Haiti, Dominicans appear to have put aside their 
resentment in favor of supporting Haitians after the 
earthquake that devastated the neighbor nation in January 
2010. Over the past several months, there has been 
unprecedented cooperation between the Dominican Republic 
and Haiti, with little evidence of a negative impact on 
domestic politics in the Dominican Republic. In fact, the 
high ratings of President Leonel Fernández and the results of 
the May Parliamentary elections may suggest that how the 
Fernández administration handled the Haitian crisis did not 
have a negative impact on citizens’ perception. However, the 
issue of Haitian immigration remains very sensitive in the 
Dominican Republic, and has the potential to become the 
major concern on the domestic political front. As of June 
2010, the Haitian crisis seemed to have little or no impact on 
Dominican politics, as the following points indicate:  
 
 The May 16, 2010 Parliamentary elections increased 
President Fernández’s political party to 31 out of 32 
Senate seats, and 105 out of 183 Chamber of 
Deputies seats; this is a total increase of 18 seats 
from the previous term. 
 Polls indicate that President Fernández has a 54 
percent approval rating.  
 Polls also indicate that Haiti is not among the most 
pressing issues of concern to Dominican citizens. 
Instead, 65 percent of the population identifies drug 
trafficking and corruption as the greatest concerns. 
 The immigration debate will remain the major 
consideration in domestic politics in the Dominican 
Republic; 62.4 percent of Dominicans polled think 
that the military should be strengthened along the 
DR-Haitian border. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
The historically tense relationship between the Dominican 
Republic and Haiti raised questions as to whether or not the 
crisis stemming from the January 11, 2010 earthquake in 
Port-au-Prince has stressed the political climate in the 
Dominican Republic. The short answer is no, at least not yet. 
Instead, Dominican society appears unsettled by the 
destruction, to the extent that Dominicans have put aside 
their feelings, for the time being, to support Haitians in 
recovering from this disaster.
1
 In fact, the crisis may have 
helped the current leadership to redirect some attention from 
other domestic pressures affecting the country, such as 
increasing crime and high unemployment. Polls released by 
“Iberobarometer” in June 2010 suggest that Dominican 
President Leonel Fernández has a 54 percent domestic 
approval rating; this is perhaps an indication of society’s 
support of his handling of the crisis in Haiti.
2
 The manner in 
which the President’s political party swept the May 
Parliamentary elections indicates no major shift in the 
people’s preference of political party or elected government 
officials. That is not to say that Dominicans have completely 
let go of traditional concerns about Haiti, but rather, at this 
moment, they have accepted the humanitarian needs and 
continue to support of their government’s policy. Still, some 
visible trends have emerged in the Dominican Republic that 
are associated with the crisis in Haiti. These trends could 
                                                 
1
 John Burnett, "For Haiti, Some Neighborly Help from Next Door," 
National Public Radio, January 2010; and Garry Pierre-Pierre, "Hatian-
Dominican Relations Warming After Quake," April 2010. 
2
 Iberoamerican Consortium of Business Marketing Research and 
Consulting (CIMA) has published its annual study The Iberoamerican 
Governability Barometer, or “Iberobarometer,” benchmarking the 
institutionalization of democratic processes in Latin America and the 
Iberian Peninsula. The School of International and Public Affairs at 
Florida International University presented the findings of the 2010 report 
on June 8, 2010. 
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impact domestic politics for Dominicans in the years to 
come, and could exacerbate some of the traditional sources 
of tension between the two countries, such as immigration.  
 
EVOLUTION OF DR-HAITIAN RELATIONS 
 
Dominican-Haitian relations have been contentious as far 
back as the immediate post-colonial era. After a series of 
Haitian invasions with the objective of unifying the island of 
Hispaniola under Haitian rule during the early to mid-1800s, 
the Dominican Republic became the only former colony in 
the Western Hemisphere to reintegrate itself with Spain—
though this reintegration was short lived. Nonetheless, this 
lends itself to the origins of how Dominicans perceive 
Haitians as a threat to the sovereignty and stability of the 
Dominican Republic—a perception that persists in 
Dominican society today. 
 
Current Dominican perceptions of Haitians were not 
institutionalized within the Dominican political system until 
the forty-year regime of Dictator General Rafael Trujillo in 
the twentieth century. While the “Era of Trujillo” for 
Dominicans was a time of economic and social growth, and 
of dictatorial repression, for Haitians living in the Dominican 
Republic, it became one of ethnic cleansing. Trujillo 
incorporated the racism in Dominican society into the 
national political system. He preached Dominican racial and 
social superiority over the Haitians while simultaneously 
intensifying the race-based class divide among Dominicans. 
Resentment toward Haitians became so great that Trujillo 
used the Dominican Army in a campaign to expel Haitians 
from the country. It culminated with the infamous Parsley 
Massacre, in which roughly 30,000 Haitian civilians were 
murdered by the Dominican Army in October 1937. Thus, 
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hostility to Haitians is rooted in Dominican history, and is 
prevalent in its socio-cultural norms.
3
 
 
After the collapse of the Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier 
regime in 1986 and the subsequent weak governments that 
have since followed, Dominicans began to view the Haitian 
threat as social in nature. In other words, while there was no 
Haitian State capable of threatening the sovereignty of the 
Dominican Republic, Haitian instability created a new threat, 
as Dominicans feared that Haitian migrants and refugees 
would attempt to assimilate Dominican society to mirror that 
of Haiti. As Mireya Navarro writes:  
 
Privately, many Dominicans speak of 
Haitians with both pity and disdain, 
stereotyping them as carriers of disease and 
practitioners of witchcraft [,] and blaming 
them for ‘blackening’ their side of the island, 
where the lighter-skinned population is mostly 
mulatto.
4
 
 
Furthermore, Dominicans feared that Haitians would be a 
drain on Dominican resources, given Haiti’s inability to 
provide even the most basic services to its citizens. Even 
after the disaster in Haiti, Dominicans worry that Haitians 
                                                 
3
 Nancy San Martin, "Hatians Crossing into the Dominican Republic 
Seeking Jobs are Finding Abuse Instead," The Miami Herald, July 19, 
2001, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/dominican/haitians-dr.htm; 
and Clare M. Ribando, "Dominican Republic: Political and Economic 
Conditions and Relations with the United States," CRS Report for 
Congres,. March 8, 2005, 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/46402.pdf. 
4
 Mireya Navarro, "At Last in Hispaniola, Hands Across the Border," 
Webster University, July 11, 1999. Mireya is now a journalist with the 
New York Times focusing on race in Hispanic societies. 
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would be a burden on Dominican health services and exhaust 
food resources “that should go to Dominicans.”5  
 
In response to the lack of stability in Haiti and the fear of 
Haitians integrating into Dominican society, recent 
Dominican administrations (beginning with President Leonel 
Fernández’s first term in 1996) have sought to address this 
concern by aiding in the stability of Haiti through improved 
relations in the areas of joint infrastructure and economic 
development. In 1996, President Fernández created a 
bilateral commission to facilitate dialogue on trade, 
immigration and tourism. Despite the efforts by the 
Dominicans to improve DR-Haiti relations, Dr. Johanna 
Mendelson-Forman argues that it was the recent earthquake 
that provided an opportunity to forge closer, more 
substantive ties between the two countries.
6
 Since the 
earthquake, both the Dominican and Haitian leadership have 
engaged in unprecedented cooperation. The earthquake made 
it imperative for the Haitian government to respond to 
overtures by the Dominicans, and the Dominican 
government has so far seized the opportunity to make the 
most of this cooperation. 
 
THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IN THE DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC POST DISASTER 
 
The Dominican Republic’s response to the disaster was and 
has been perceived in a very positive manner by both its 
citizens and the international community.
7
 Immediately 
                                                 
5
 Daniel Roth, "Tension Grows in the Border with Dominican Republic 
as Hatians Try to Escape," The Miami Herald, January 16, 2010, 
http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/01/16/1428997/tension-grows-in-the-
border-with.html.     
6
 Interview with Johanna Mendelson Forman of the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. on June 3, 2010. 
7
 "Enemies: A Love Story," Newsweek, April 5, 2010, 
http://www.newsweek.com/2010/04/14/enemies-a-love-story.html. 
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following the earthquake, Haitian President René Préval was 
flown to the Dominican Republic in order to communicate 
with the international community, and President Fernández 
was the first head of state to visit Haiti following the 
disaster. Paying little attention to historical tension, but with 
an eye on immigration concerns, the Dominican Republic 
was the first country to provide relief to Haiti immediately 
following the earthquake.
8
 The Dominican Republic opened 
its seaports and airports to facilitate and act as a staging 
ground for the delivery of international aid to Haiti, and 
Dominican authorities have demonstrated little tolerance for 
those in the country attempting to hoard aid going into 
Haiti.
9
 Although a sensitive issue, the Dominican Republic 
has also provided healthcare to Haitians along the border.  
 
Despite the outpouring of support by the Dominican 
Republic, the immediate concern for most Dominicans was 
the threat of a major exodus of refugees into the Dominican 
Republic, and the immediate provision of relief supplies to 
Haiti. An initial offer by the Dominican government to the 
United Nations to deploy an estimated 150 to 800 Dominican 
soldiers under the command of MINUSTAH was reluctantly 
accepted by Haiti. The Dominican forces were integrated 
into the “Peruvian contingent of MINUSTAH, stationed 
along the Haiti side of the 370 kilometer-long border.”10  
 
According to The Miami Herald, heavily armed Dominican 
soldiers were positioned along Highway 46, the primary road 
                                                 
8
 "Dominican Republic Aid to Haiti Eases Historic Tensions," CNN, 13 
January 2010, 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/americas/01/13/haiti.earthquake.do
minican.republic/index.html. 
9
 "Enemies: A Love Story." 
10
 "Dominican Troops to Deploy in Haiti Despite Concerns," 
DominicanToday.com, February 5, 2010, 
http://www.dominicantoday.com/dr/local/2010/2/4/34715/Dominican-
troops-to-deploy-in-Haiti-despite-concerns.   
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connecting Haiti and the Dominican Republic, in order to 
ensure Haitians stayed on their side of the island.
11
 Despite 
the presence of Dominican forces some media reports 
suggest Haitians have been able to cross the border into the 
Dominican Republic.
12
 However, a mass exodus has yet to 
occur, and this is the main reason the crisis in Haiti has not 
negatively impacted politics in the Dominican Republic. 
 
INDICATORS OF THE IMPACT OF THE HAITI CRISIS 
ON DOMINICAN POLITICS 
 
On May 16, 2010, the Dominican Republic held 
parliamentary elections for its Senate and Chamber of 
Deputies. The Dominican Liberation Party (referred to by the 
Spanish acronym PLD), the party of President Fernández, 
increased its parliamentary majority by winning 31 of 32 
Senate seats, and 105 of 183 Chamber of Deputies seats. The 
overwhelming electoral success of the PLD can be 
considered an indirect referendum on the Fernández 
Administration’s post-earthquake Haitian initiatives. Some 
also attribute the success of the PLD to the lack of 
organization and unpopularity of opposition parties in the 
Dominican Republic. Nonetheless, the clear mandate of the 
PLD reflects some degree of voter contentment with the 
PLD. The lack of debate during the elections over the 
country’s role in assisting Haiti’s recovery effort was a result 
of the less-than-expected effects on the Dominican Republic. 
According to Dr. Eduardo Gamarra, Professor of Political 
Science at Florida International University, the PLD’s 
success was evidence of the small disapproval by the 
electorate with the government’s disaster limitation and 
recovery policies; he believes the opposite would have 
severely limited the PLD’s prospects for success.  
                                                 
11
 Roth, "Tension Grows in the Border with Dominican Republic as 
Hatians Try to Escape." 
12
 Ibid. 
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Recent polling conducted in the Dominican Republic by the 
“Iberobarometer” project suggests that the crisis in Haiti is 
not among the top concerns on the minds of Dominicans; 
accordingly, drug trafficking and corruption are the major 
domestic issues, and account for 65 percent of those 
polled—46.6 and 18.3 percent, respectively.13 Dominicans 
also appear content with President Fernández. In the same 
polling project, 54 percent approved of President Fernández; 
52 percent think he has done a very good job with foreign 
relations; and 55 percent think he has done a very good job 
with neighboring countries, particularly Haiti.  
 
Although President Fernández’s popularity still remains 
positive after his handling of the earthquake in Haiti, 
concerns among Dominicans remain with regard to assisting 
the Haitian recovery effort. Nearly 60 percent of Dominicans 
polled felt that the Dominican Republic helped Haiti beyond 
the means of the DR, while, in a separate question, 23.7 
percent believe that no more aid should go to Haiti. The 
polling results also suggest that the top issue with respect to 
the crisis in Haiti could very well center on immigration. In 
December 2009, the Dominican Congress paved the way for 
a constitutional amendment aimed at repatriating 800,000 
Dominican residents of Haitian origins to include children 
born to illegal immigrants.
14
 Although the Dominican 
Republic eased its immigration policies for some requiring 
medical attention, 84.9 percent of Dominicans polled by 
“Iberobarometer” thought that the government should not 
grant Haitians temporary legal status, while 79.7 percent felt 
the government should not repatriate undocumented Haitians 
                                                 
13
 The results of the “Iberobarometer” project were discussed in an 
interview with Eduardo Gamarra prior to the official release on June 8, 
2010. The interview was held on May 17, 2010. 
14
 Fred Grimm, "A Look at a Dominican Republic," The Miami Herald, 
January 26, 2010. In an interview with Johanna Medelson Forman of the 
Center for the Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, 
D.C.  
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and earthquake victims. The polling data suggests that 
although an overwhelming majority of Dominicans do not 
want to grant Haitians temporary legal status, the majority 
remains apprehensive about repatriating Haitians and 
earthquake victims under the current crisis. Dominicans do 
not want Haitians immigrating to the Dominican Republic 
under other circumstances, given that 62.4 percent believes 
that the military should be strengthened along the DR-Haiti 
border. According to Gamarra, the results of the 
“Iberobarometer” project suggest that, while immigration 
remains the concern among Dominicans, its impact on 
domestic politics is minimal at best, and at least for now will 
not result in shifts in the current political landscape.
15
  
 
                                                 
15
 Interview with Eduardo Gamarra, Professor of Political Science at 
Florida International University and DR Special Envoy to Haiti on June 
7, 2010. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
While the crisis in Haiti has not been a major strain on 
domestic politics in the Dominican Republic, immigration 
will emerge as a national issue as the number of Haitians in 
the DR drastically increases and the sympathy of 
Dominicans over the disaster wanes. Some Dominicans are 
already taking notice of the increased visibility of Haitians in 
urban sprawls like Santo Domingo.
16
 Combined with high 
unemployment rates, crime, and the burden on government 
services, increased numbers of immigrants coming across the 
DR-Haiti border (exacerbated by the disaster in Haiti) will 
become a major issue on the national agenda. According to 
Dominican Army Colonel Frank Mauricio Cabrera Rizek of 
the Dominican Ministry of the Armed Forces, as the aid to 
Haiti gradually decreases, more and more Haitians will 
attempt to leave; many of them will choose to go to the 
Dominican Republic for better opportunities and basic 
needs.
17
 Another consideration affecting immigration from 
Haiti to the Dominican Republic is the threat of a major 
storm during the 2010 hurricane season. According to the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
the 2010 season could experience between 14 and 24 storms 
in the Atlantic and Caribbean.
18
 Given that most of the 
infrastructure in Haiti was destroyed by the earthquake, a 
major storm could trigger a mass exodus into the Dominican 
Republic and create a conflict between Haitians and 
Dominicans over relief supplies. An event like this would 
certainly put pressure on the Dominican government to 
                                                 
16
 Interview with Coronel Frank Mauricio Cabrera Rizek, Deputy 
Director of Plans and Operations in the Ministry of Armed Forces and 
Advisor to the Security and Defense Commission of the Senate on May 
26, 2010. 
17
 Ibid.  
18
 “State of the Climate Annual 2010,” NOAA, National Climatic 
Data Center, 2010, http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/2010/13.  
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respond. Colonel Cabrera Rizek and others argue that, over 
time during this period of crisis, the current tolerance of 
Haitians by Dominicans could produce a significantly larger 
Haitian community in the Dominican Republic, and create a 
clash on the domestic political front in the future. 
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